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Introduction
When a person buys a loaf of bread bearing a price tag of $1 at a
supermarket, this is the price that he pays at the check-out register.
When a person buys an airline ticket from a travel agent, the agent
quotes him a price, and this is the price that he pays for the ticket.
However, when a person buys a ticket to a concert or sporting event
through the exclusive computerized ticket distributor for the event, he
does not pay only the price quoted on the ticket. He also must pay a
series of undisclosed surcharges which the ticket distributor adds to
the base ticket price. These service charges supposedly represent the
cost of the "convenience" that the computerized ticketing service
provides.
Prior to the development of computerized ticketing systems, consumers were invariably required to go to a venue's box office, where
they often had to wait many hours (and possibly even camp out overnight) in order to acquire tickets for an entertainment event.' Computerized ticketing has given the public the convenience of being able
to buy tickets in their own community or by telephone.2 As most
ticket buyers know, however, such convenience has a cost-often a
steep cost. It is a cost that has been rising over the last ten years at a
pace several times greater than the rate of inflation. Consequently,
many are beginning to question whether the service charges of computerized ticketing services represent the true cost of convenience.
Specifically, many have argued that these hidden charges are the result of anticompetitive business practices and unlawful trade restraints
created by the ticketing services and the live event facilities and promoters with whom they enter into agreements.
This Note analyzes the merits of the state class action antitrust
suits that were filed in 1992 in California Superior Court against the
two dominant computerized ticket distributors in California: Ticketmaster-Southern California, Inc. (Ticketmaster) and Bay Area Seating Service, Inc. (BASS). One of these suits, Cravens v. Bay Area
Seating Service, Inc.,3 also named several major California promoters
and entertainment venues as codefendants. Three of the class actions,
consolidated under the name Notz v. Ticketmaster-Southern Califor1. Louis Fogelman, The "Overwhelming Majority of Ticket Buyers" Are Pleased,L.A.
June 22, 1992, at F3.
2. Id.
3. See Plaintiffs' Complaint, Cravens v. Bay Area Seating Serv., Inc., No. 943-387
(San Francisco, Cal. Super. Ct. filed June 3, 1992).
TIMES,
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nia, Inc.,4 were recently settled amid much criticism from consumer

groups and antitrust attorneys.5 The Cravens suit, however, never
went forward due to the disqualification of one of the plaintiffs' counsel as class attorney.6 Nevertheless, this Note focuses on the claims

that were made in the Cravens suit, since they are much more comprehensive than those made in the Notz consolidated class action.7
Part I reviews the history and structure of the computerized ticketing services industry and the events that led to the filing of the class
action antitrust suits. It concludes by outlining the major state antitrust and related claims of the Cravens complaint. Part II discusses
the relevant statutes and case law under which each of these claims
falls, focusing on California's main antitrust statute, the Cartwright
4. Consolidated Amended Complaint, Notz v. Ticketmaster-S. Cal., Inc., No. 943-327
(San Francisco, Cal. Super. Ct. filed Feb. 22, 1993).
5. The settlement agreement, approved by San Francisco Superior Court Judge Richard Figone in May 1994, contains five main components:
(1) Ticketmaster and BASS will provide $1.5 million worth of tickets to charitable
organizations over the next four years.
(2) The two agencies will set aside $750,000 for plaintiffs' attorneys' fees.
(3) Ticketmaster and BASS, "consistent with past practices," will not interfere with
the ability of venues to set their own box office hours and surcharges.
(4) No person can serve simultaneously as a corporate officer or director of both
agencies.
(5) The terms of BASS's 1986 licensing agreement with Ticketmaster will not be enforced for the next four years.
The settlement applies to anyone who bought tickets from the two agencies or Ticketron between June 1, 1988 and March 22, 1994. No class members will receive damages
under the terms of the settlement, and Ticketmaster and BASS admit no wrongdoing in the
case. Ken Hoover, Ticket Agencies Settle Class-Action Suits, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 30, 1994, at
A22; Bill Kisliuk, Critics Say Settlement Is Soft on Ticket Agencies, THE RECORDER, Mar.
31, 1994, at 3; Jesse Hamlin, BASS Settlement Called a "Raw Deal", S.F. CHRON., Apr. 15,
1994, at C1.
Consumer groups and some antitrust attorneys involved in the case have sharply criticized the settlement agreement. Consumer Action of San Francisco calls the agreement a
"sweetheart deal" for the plaintiffs' attorneys but not for consumers. Hamlin, supra. Joseph M. Alioto, who filed the first of the class action suits in June 1992, opted out of the
settlement because he felt it demanded far too little of the defendants. Kisliuk, supra.
Alioto claimed that "[o]ne of the main problems with the settlement is that if you took a
penny out of your pocket right now, that's more than anybody in California will get from
this case." Id. Another former plaintiffs' attorney, Thomas Jenkins, characterized the settlement as "wretched," and believed that a battle between plaintiffs' counsel over leadership in the class action may have contributed to a lack of willingness to "prosecute it
vigorously." Id.
6. Order Granting Defendant Bill Graham Presents, Inc.'s Motion to Disqualify
Plaintiff's Counsel, Cravens (No. 943-387).
7. The Cravens suit was the most. comprehensive of the class action antitrust suits
since it was the only one specifically naming promoters and venues as codefendants with
Ticketmaster and BASS. See Plaintiffs' Complaint, at 1, Cravens (No. 943-387). The Notz
consolidated class action named only Ticketmaster and BASS as codefendants. See Consolidated Amended Complaint, at 1, Notz (No. 943-327).
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Act.8 Using the evidence available, the antitrust claims against the
Cravens codefendants are analyzed and the conclusion is drawn that
these parties are acting in violation of provisions of the Cartwright
Act and other related statutes. Part III concludes by evaluating possible remedies available to consumers for these practices, and offers
suggestions for returning and maintaining competition in the retail
ticketing services market.
I
History and Background
A. The Beginnings of the Business

In the beginning, there was only Ticketron. Ticketron was the
first company in the country to create computerized ticketing systems
for major entertainment events.9 Founded in 1968,0 the company was
the dominant player in the business until the emergence of Ticketmaster in the 1980s. Ticketmaster, established in 1976, initially only
licensed computer programs and sold ticketing system hardware to entertainment venues across the country.'1 The company switched its
main focus to the computerized ticketing business beginning in 1982,
when the wealthy Pritzker family of Chicago became its controlling
shareholders.' 2 At the time, Ticketron had a virtual monopoly of the
market.13 Ticketmaster, however, was able to make sharp inroads into
Ticketron's dominance in only a short period, and it ultimately acquired Ticketron in 1991.14 The class action antitrust suits revolved
around how Ticketmaster was able to achieve its present dominant
position.
B. How the Computerized Ticketing Service Market Operates

The source of revenue for a ticketing service company such as
Ticketmaster is the various fees which it adds to the price of a ticket.
8. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 16700-16770 (West 1987).
9. Howard Gold, No Quick Tix Fix, FORBES, Mar. 10, 1986, at 150.

10. Heidi Evans, Rival to Ticketron; Ticketmaster Emerging as Force in L.A., L.A.
TIMES, Jan. 31, 1985, pt. 4, at 1.

11. Id.
12. Id. The Pritzkers were recently estimated by Forbes magazine to have a net worth
of $4.6 billion. Bruce Mohl, Rising Ticket Fees Pad Concert Profits, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept.
20, 1992, at B1. In November 1993, Paul Allen paid the Pritzkers over $300 million for an
80% stake in Ticketmaster. Allen, a cofounder of software giant Microsoft Corp., was
recently estimated by Forbes to have a net worth of $2.9 billion. Jay Greene, Ticketmaster
Sold, DAILY VARIETY, Nov. 23, 1993, at 1.

13. John R. Emshwiller, Ticketmaster: A True Sports Dynasty, Cincinnati Post, June
20, 1991, at 10B.
14. Paul Farhi, Competitor to Acquire Ticketron, WASH. POST, Feb. 28, 1991, at B10.
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These fees vary according to the event for which the ticket is

purchased,' 5 the facility at which the event is playing16 and whether
the ticket was purchased by phone or in person at the ticket agency. 17
The fees charged can increase the price of a ticket from 20% to 44%
of its listed face value."8 The only way a consumer can avoid paying
these extra charges is by purchasing the ticket directly at a venue box
office, thereby bypassing the computerized ticketing service
altogether. 19

The foundation of the computerized ticketing service business is
the exclusive dealing agreement. Rather than competing directly for
consumers' business, the ticket services make payments to event promoters and venue officials.20 In return, the promoters and venues
grant the individual ticketing service the exclusive right to sell their

tickets by phone or through outlets located primarily in music and
department stores.2 1 These exclusive dealing agreements usually are
three to five years in length.22
The component of the exclusive agreements that makes them so
attractive to the promoters and venues is the payment formula. In
addition to paying these entities a fixed sum of money in return for
exclusive rights, the ticketing service usually gives them a fixed per15. For example, the March 31, 1992 "Concert for Walden Woods" at the Universal
Ampitheatre in Los Angeles had an official ticket price of $35, but a $5 "convenience" fee
was added by Ticketmaster if the ticket was purchased by phone. However, around the
same time, the Ticketmaster convenience fee for purchasing by phone a $25 ticket to a
concert by the rock group U2 at the Los Angeles Sports Arena was $5.50. Chuck Philips,
Service Fees Drive Up Purchase Prices, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 23, 1992, at A12 [hereinafter
Philips, Service Fees]. According to Ticketmaster, the phone convenience fee it charges is
applied toward such costs as sales operators, a telephone switching network, local number
phone line access and credit card fees. Chuck Philips, Ticket Flap: What Price Convenience?, L.A. TIMES, May 10, 1991, at F22 [hereinafter Philips, Ticket Flap].
16. Venues which have contracted with Ticketmaster on the average charge a $2 "facility" fee for each ticket sold. Philips, Ticket Flap, supra note 15. These facility fees are
retained by the venue for "refurbishment" costs. Id.
17. See Philips, Service Fees, supra note 15. See also Philips, Ticket Flap,supra note 15
(explaining how a $17.50 ticket becomes a $26.05 ticket if purchased by phone from
Ticketmaster).
18. Chuck Philips, A Tangle Over Tickets, L.A. TIMES, June 9, 1992, at Fl. For example, a general admission ticket to a February 23, 1993 Grateful Dead concert at the Oakland Coliseum Arena had a face value of $24, but BASS added a $5.25 convenience fee to
each ticket and a $4.40 "handling" fee to each order charged by phone. These fees represented anywhere from 26% (four tickets ordered) to 40% (one ticket ordered) of the face
value of the ticket.
19. Mohl, supra note 12.
20. Farhi, supra note 14; Hamlin, supra note 5.
21. Farhi, supra note 14; see also Hamlin, supra note 5.
22. See Kathleen Pender, BASS' Grip on Ticket Sales Tightens, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 26,
1990, at C1 (documenting BASS chairman Jerry Seltzer admitting that he requires new
clients to agree to exclusive three- to five-year contracts).

HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J.

[Vol. 16:349

centage of the service fee revenue it collects from ticket sales. 23 Since
the agreements are exclusive, the ticketing service is able to finance
this fee-splitting scheme by charging higher convenience fees to the
public without fear of losing business.24 Furthermore, the agreements
either expressly or implicitly limit the number of hours the venue box
office remains open and the number of tickets available at the box
office.25 Thus, the ticket buyer is usually presented with no choice but
to use a computerized ticketing service. As the limitations on choice
increase, so do the ticketing service's revenues.
Ticketmaster perfected the practice of giving service charge rebates to venues and promoters in exchange for exclusive rights to sell
their tickets.2 6 Available evidence indicates that Ticketmaster pays
eighteen percent to twenty-two percent of its convenience fee revenues to the various theaters, arenas and stadiums that are part of its
exclusive network.2 7 The company was able to take business away
from Ticketron in the 1980s largely by guaranteeing venues and promoters a higher percentage of service charges from ticket sales, which
in turn led to higher and constantly-increasing convenience fees on
tickets. 28 Indeed, service charges on tickets to sporting and entertainment events have increased at rates greater than medical care costs
and California real estate prices during approximately the last ten
years.2 9

23. Mohl, supra note 12; Hamlin, supra note 5.
24. Mohl, supra note 12.
25. See id. "Many box offices operate for fewer hours and often well after Ticketmaster phone lines and outlets have opened. In fact, some concert venues open their box
offices only on the night of the show or ... a full two days after tickets [go] on sale through
Ticketmaster." Id.
As part of the Notz settlement agreement, Ticketmaster and BASS will allow each
venue to set its own box office hours. See supra note 4. However, the settlement does not
require venues to keep box offices open longer hours. Thus, since many venues receive a
share of the service charge revenues from Ticketmaster or BASS, the incentive to limit
their box office hours remains.
26. Id.
27. Id. Ticketmaster, while acknowledging that it pays rebates to the venues and promoters' with which it contracts, asserts that such payments are a normal cost of business
that are no different from payments made to entertainment venues by food, merchandise
and parking concessionaires for the exclusive right to market their products and services at
events. Id. Ticketmaster chairman Fred Rosen also stated in an editorial explaining the
basis for his company's convenience fees that "Ticketmaster is a concessionaire much like
Pepsi or Coke, food, parking, etc." Fredric D. Rosen, Convenience-What's It Worth?; Fee
Puts Tickets a Call or a Short Trip Away, L.A. TIMES, June 22, 1992, at F3.
28. Evans, supra note 10; Pender, supra note 22; Gold, supra note 9.
29. Pender, supra note 22.
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'licketmaster Takes Control of the Market

In 1986, BASS, the dominant computerized ticketing service in
Northern California, entered into a licensing agreement with Ticketmaster 3 0 This agreement, among other things, allows BASS to use
Ticketmaster's computer system and its name in advertising.3 1 More
importantly, the agreement allocates the Northern California service
market exclusively to BASS, but at the same time restricts the company from competing with Ticketmaster in the lucrative Southern California market.3 2 Thus, under the terms of the licensing agreement,
the two companies do not compete with each other, and Ticketmaster
has de facto control of the Northern and Southern California
markets.3 3
In 1991, after years of intense rivalry, Ticketmaster was able to
acquire Ticketron, thereby eliminating its only serious nationwide
competitor. This left Ticketmaster with a near-monopoly of the ticketing services market in forty-two states. 34 Under the Hart-ScottRodino Act,3 5 the transaction had to be approved by the United
States Justice Department.36 Despite opposition from the Consumer
Federation of America and other critics, the Justice Department ap30. Id.
31. Thpper Hull, How Marks Joined the Ticket Wars, S.F. EXAMINER, Jan. 10, 1993, at
B4. BASS, however, stopped using the Ticketmaster name in its advertisements sometime
in 1992 after California state legislators and others began raising questions about its operations. Id.
32. Pender, supra note 22.
33. BASS and Ticketmaster insist that, despite appearances to the contrary, they are
separate business entities. However, it is worth noting that BASS Chairman Jerry Seltzer
also serves as vice president of marketing for Ticketmaster. Hull, supra note 31.
However, the Notz class action settlement provides that the Ticketmaster-BASS licensing agreement will not be enforced for the next four years, and nothing shall prohibit
Ticketmaster and BASS from competing anywhere in California for the sale of tickets.
Furthermore, the companies agreed to a ban on, anyone acting simultaneously as officers
for both corporations. Kisliuk, supra note 5; Hamlin, supra note 5; Hoover, supra note 5.
34. Mark Albright, Getting a Charge Out of Tickets, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Sept. 20,
1992, at 11; see also Farhi, supra note 14.
35. Pub. L. No. 94-435, Title II, § 201, 90 Stat. 1390 (1976) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 18a (1993)). The Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976
amended federal antimerger law by establishing premerger notification and waiting requirements for corporations planning to consummate certain sized mergers and acquisitions. H.R. REP. No. 1373, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1976), reprintedin 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2637, 2637. The purpose of the Act was to strengthen enforcement of § 18 by giving government agencies a fair and reasonable opportunity to detect and investigate large mergers
of questionable legality before they are consummated. Id. The government therefore has
a chance to get a premerger injunction before the assets, management and other elements
of the merging firms are irreversibly combined, and before competition is substantially and
perhaps irreversibly effected, in violation of federal antitrust law. Id.
36. Philips, supra note 18.
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proved the acquisition in May 1991. 37 Since acquiring Ticketron, Ticketmaster's revenues have sharply increased, from $650 million in
ticket sales in 1990 to approximately $1 billion in 1991.38
D.

Consumer Complaints and Attempts at Regulation

Consumer complaints about Ticketmaster's service charges and
practices have also sharply increased since its acquisition of Ticketron.39 These complaints have, in turn, sparked government interest.
For example, in July 1992, the New York City Consumer Affairs Commissioner charged two major concert promoters with deceptive advertising for advertising tickets at prices not available anywhere.40 The
tickets were sold exclusively through Ticketmaster and the advertisements listed only face value ticket prices. 4 '
In California, state legislators responded to consumer complaints
by introducing legislation that would have regulated the fees and business practices of computerized ticketing services. In 1990, even prior
to Ticketmaster's acquisition of Ticketron, Assemblyman Rusty
Arieas introduced a bill that would have required all event promoters
to disclose service charges as well as ticket prices in their advertising.42
The bill died in committee after the concert industry lobbied heavily
against it.43 In March 1992, State Senator Milton Marks introduced a
bill providing much more comprehensive regulation.44 The proposed
legislation would have capped service charges for any ticket sold
through a ticket agency at fifteen percent of the ticket price, and required that at least thirty percent of tickets to any major entertainment event be sold at face value through the box office of the venue
37. Id. The Justice Department's rationale for approving the buyout was that Ticketron was economically strapped and was likely to go out of business without the merger,
and therefore the market would have been left with only one company regardless of the
Department's approval. Jeffrey Jolson-Colburn, Ticketmaster is Buying its Bitter Rival,
Ticketron, BILLBOARD, Mar. 9, 1991, at 92. This argument is commonly referred to as the
"failing company" doctrine. See 5 PHILLIP AREEDA & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST
924-31
LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION
(1980).
38. Susan C. Schema, Revenues Soar for Ticketmaster After Buying Rival Firm, S.D.
Bus. J., July 29, 1991, § 1, at 1.
39. See, e.g., Philips, Ticket Flap, supra note 15.
40. Ed Leibowitz, Rock Promoters ChargedWith Using Deceptive Ads, NEWSDAY, July
30, 1992, at 47. Ticketmaster was not targeted by the Commissioner once it agreed to
cooperate with the investigation. Id.
41. Id. Ticketmaster and BASS have long refused to disclose specific service charges
on their event advertising. Instead, the advertisements usually state (in small print) "all
tickets subject to service or convenience fee."
42. Pender, supra note 22.
43. Philips, Ticket Flap, supra note 15.
44. Philips, supra note 18.
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where the event is being held.4 5 Senator Marks's bill was also defeated in committee, but not until after BASS and Ticketmaster engaged in an "unusually aggressive campaign" to defeat the bill.46
E.

Class Action Antitrust Suits Filed

After Senator Marks's bill was defeated and the California Attorney General turned down Marks's request for an investigation of
Ticketmaster for state antitrust law violations,4 7 two consumer groups
filed class action antitrust suits against Ticketmaster and BASS in June
1992, in San Francisco County Superior Court.48 One of the suits,
Cravens v. BASS, not only named Ticketmaster and BASS as defendants, but also named three major California event promoters and
three California concert venues, all of which have exclusive dealing
arrangements with either Ticketmaster or BASS. 49 The suit was
45. Tlipper Hull, Marks Bill to Limit Charges by Ticket Agencies Killed, S.F. EXAMApr. 7, 1992, at A2. The bill (S.B. 1896) also required full disclosure of service and
handling charges in all advertisements, full refunds (including service.charges) for canceled
events and a full day's sale of tickets at the venue's box office before ticket blocks were
released to the computerized ticket agencies. Judith Green, BASS Fights Ticket Fee Limits,
S.J. MERCURY NEWS, Apr. 7, 1992, at 1A.
46. Tupper Hull, Ticket Agencies Play Tough in the Capitol, S.F. EXAMINER, Jan. 10,
1993, at B1. To defeat Senator Marks's bill, Ticketmaster and BASS not only employed
lobbyists, made several political campaign contributions and held private meetings with
legislators, but they also took extensive depositions from persons who participated in the
debate on the proposed legislation. Id. Senator Marks described Ticketmaster's efforts as
"a lobbyists' feeding frenzy." Hull, supra note 45.
47. Tupper Hull, Attorney General's Office Won't Probe Ticketmaster, S.F. EXAMINER,
Aug. 5, 1992, at A7. There was some confusion as to why the Attorney General's office
turned down the request. An antitrust expert in the office said the office lacked the time
and money to conduct an investigation, although there was "some evidence that Ticketmaster may be operating as an unlawful monopoly." California Attorney General Dan
Lungren, on the other hand, cited a lack of grounds to sue, stating that "[njo evidence has
been brought to our attention indicating that Ticketmaster possesses unlawful monopoly
power." Id.
48. BASS has been sued previously for state antitrust law violations. In 1988, San Jose
Box Office, an independent ticket agency, brought suit against BASS, Ticketmaster and
promoter Bill Graham Presents, Inc., accusing them of conspiring to fix service charges and
using exclusive dealing contracts to drive independent agencies out of the market. Rebecca Salner, Agency's Suit Says BASS Uses Unfair Tactics, S.J. MERCURY NEWS, Jan. 19,
1988, at 1A. The suit was eventually settled out of court in 1991. Philips, Ticket Flap, supra
note 15.
49. Plaintiffs' Complaint, at 1, Cravens (No. 943-387). The named promoters are Bill
Graham. Presents, Inc., New Avalon, Inc. and Nederlander of California, Inc. Id. It is
alleged that Bill Graham Presents is the dominant live entertainment promoter in Northern California. Id. 38. New Avalon and Nederlander are claimed to be the major live
entertainment promoters in Southern California. Id. 1% 41, 46. The named concert venues
are the Shoreline Ampitheatre Irvine Meadows Ampitheatre and the Pacific Ampitheatre.
Id. at 1. The Shoreline Ampitheatre, located in Mountain View, California, is controlled
and operated by Bill Graham Enterprises, Inc. Id. 1 51-52. Irvine Meadows AmpitheaINER,
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brought pursuant to California's main antitrust statute, the Cartwright
Act," and related statutes that prohibit unfair trade practices and unfair competition.5 The Cravens plaintiffs sought at least $100 million
in damages from the defendants and also permanent injunctive relief
to prevent further antitrust violations by the defendants.- 2
F. The Specific Claims Against the Defendants

The Cravens complaint enumerates five major claims against the
defendants. 3 First, the plaintiffs claim that Ticketmaster and BASS
have combined and conspired with the promoters and venues "to fix,
control and affect the service charges and/or prices of tickets" in violation of the Cartwright Act. 4 Second, the complaint alleges that the
licensing agreement between BASS and Ticketmaster constitutes a division of market between competitors 5 that restrains trade in violation of the Cartwright Act.5 6 The third claim is that BASS's and
Ticketmaster's contracts with the venues and promoters are exclusive
dealing agreements prohibited by the Cartwright Act because they restrain trade and substantially foreclose competition in the market. 7
The two other major claims against the Cravens defendants involve statutes that are closely related to the antitrust provisions of the
Cartwright Act. One is that Ticketmaster and BASS have made payments of "secret rebates" to venues and promoters in order to obtain
their exclusive dealing agreements with these parties, and have conspired to raise service charges in order to finance this rebate scheme. 8
tre, located in Irvine, California, is owned by New Avalon. Id.
58. The Pacific
Ampitheatre, located in Costa Mesa, California, was built and is operated by Nederlander.
Id. 56. A fourth venue codefendant, the Concord Pavilion, located in Concord, California, was dismissed from the suit without prejudice on November 25, 1992. Order of Dismissal, Cravens v. BASS, No. 943-387 (San Francisco, Cal. Super. Ct. filed Nov. 25, 1992).
50. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 16700-16758.
51. Plaintiffs' Complaint, 1 66-73, Cravens (No. 943-387).
52. Id. T 60, 65, 66, 68.
53. In addition to the claims discussed above, the suit also alleges that the defendants
violated § 17500 of the California Business & Professions Code for using deceptive and
false advertising regarding service charges. Plaintiffs' Complaint, i 73, Cravens (No. 943387). Since this claim is only tangentially related to the antitrust claims, this Note will not
discuss or analyze its merits.
54. Id. [ 60, 65-66. The provisions of the Cartwright Act at issue are found at California Business & Professions Code §§ 16720 and 16726.
55. A division of market between competitors occurs when a business agrees with
competitors not to sell its product outside its respective territory and the competitors in
return agree not to compete against the business in its territory. Gordon M. Cowan, California's Single-Firm Monopoly Loophole, 18 CAL. W.L. REV. 240, 250 (1982).
56. Plaintiffs' Complaint, 11 23, 33, 65, 66, Cravens (No. 943-387).
57. Id. T 60-66.
58. Id. 91 60-62.
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According to the complaint, payment of these secret rebates injures

competition and consumers, and is therefore specifically prohibited by
section 17045 of the California Business and Professions Code, 59 a
provision of the Unfair Practices Act (UPA). ° The other is that the
defendants' conduct, including the antitrust violations, constitutes
"unlawful, unfair, and deceptive business practices" prohibited by section 17200 of the California Business and Professions Code.6 ' This
provision is part of California's Unfair Competition statutes. 62

Discussion and Analysis of the Antitrust Claims
A. The Cartwright Act and How It Compares to the Federal Sherman
Act

It is necessary to have an understanding of the Cartwright Act,63
California's primary antitrust statute, in order to analyze the specific
antitrust claims against the Cravens defendants. Presently codified at
California Business and Professions Code sections 16700 to 16770, the
Cartwright Act was enacted in 19071 for the purpose of protecting

and fostering business competition. 65 The Act declares all trusts, except as otherwise provided, "unlawful, against public policy, and
void."' 66 It defines a trust as "a combination of capital, skill, or acts by
two or more persons" that restrains trade or commerce.67 Although
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
Bus. &
65.

Id.

62.
Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 17000-17101 (West 1987 & Supp. 1994).
Plaintiffs' Complaint, IT 72-73, Cravens (No. 943-387).
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 17200-17208.
Id. §§ 16700-16770.
Cartwright Act, ch. 530, § 1, 1907 Stats. 986 (1907) (codified as amended at CAL.
PROF. CODE §§ 16700-16770).
See State ex rel. Van de Kamp v. Texaco, Inc., 762 P.2d 385, 387 (Cal. 1988).
66. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16726.
67. California Business & Professions Code § 16720 provides as follows:
A trust is a combination of capital, skill or acts by two or more persons for any of
the following purposes:
(a) To create or carry out restrictions in trade or commerce.
(b) To limit or reduce the production, or increase the price of merchandise or of
any commodity.
(c) To prevent competition in manufacturing, making, transportation, sale or
purchase of merchandise, produce or any commodity.
(d) To fix at any standard or figure, whereby its price to the public or consumer
shall be in any manner controlled or established, any article or commodity of
merchandise, produce or commerce intended for sale barter, use or consumption
inthis State.
(e) To make or enter into or execute or carry out any contracts, obligations or
agreements of any kind or description, by which they do all or any or any combination of any of the following:
CAL.
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the Cartwright Act, by its terms, only refers to "commodities," the
California Supreme Court held in Marin County Bd. of Realtors v.
Palsson6 8 that the Cartwright Act also applies to the sale of "serv-

ices. '"69 The court reasoned that the policies behind the Cartwright
Act and the intent of the Act's drafters compelled application of the
Cartwright Act to service industries, which would include ticketing
services.7 °

Section 16720 specifies several forms of concerted activity that
constitute illegal trusts, including price fixing.71 In addition, section
16727, added to the Business and Professions Code in 1961,72 specifically prohibits exclusive dealing and tying arrangements7 3 that "sub-

stantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly. '74 This
provision was essentially adapted from section 3 of the federal Clayton Act.75 Exclusive dealing and tying arrangements have been held
to be governed by section 16720's general prohibition against unreasonable trade restraints as well as by the more specific provisions of
section 16727.76

The Cartwright Act's general federal counterpart is the Sherman
Act. 77 Section 1 of the Sherman Act declares contracts, combinations,
combinations resembling trusts, and conspiracies resembling trusts
(1) Bind themselves not to sell, dispose of or transport any article or any
commodity or any article of trade, use, merchandise, commerce or consumption
below a common standard figure, or fixed value.
(2) Agree in any manner to keep the price of such article, commodity or
transportation at a fixed or graduated figure.
(3) Establish or settle the price of any article, commodity or transportation
between them or themselves and others, so as directly or indirectly to preclude a
free and unrestricted competition among themselves, or any purchasers or consumers in the sale or transportation of any such article or commodity.
(4) Agree to pool, combine or directly or indirectly unite any interests that
they may have connected with the sale or transportation of any such article or
commodity, that its price might in any manner be affected.
68. 549 P.2d 833 (Cal. 1976).
69. Id. at 837.
70. Id.
71. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16720(d).
72. Ch. 738, § 1, 1961 Stat. 1978 (1961) (codified as amended at CAL. Bus. & PROF.
CODE § 16727).

73. A tying arrangement is a contract or agreement in which the seller or lessor conditions the sale or lease of goods or services (the "tying" product) on the purchase of another
product or service (the "tied" product).
74. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16727.
75. Ch. 323, § 3, 38 Stat. 731 (1914) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1988)).
76. Gary L. Fontana & Joseph Hunsader, Application of the California Cartwright Act
to Vertical Restraints, THE IMPACT OF CALIFORNIA'S PROPOSITION 103 ON INSURANCE AND
RELATED INDUSTRIES, at 6 (Sept. 11, 1989).
77. The Sherman Act, ch. 647, §§ 1-8, 26 Stat. 209-10 (1890) (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C. § 1-7 (1988)).
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that restrain trade or commerce illegal, and makes it a felony to engage in such practices.7" Section 2 of the Sherman Act provides that it

is a felony to monopolize, attempt to monopolize, or conspire or combine to monopolize any part of trade or commerce in the United
States.79

A comparison of the Cartwright Act (sections 16720 and 16726 in
particular) with the Sherman Act reveals that the California antitrust
statute is very similar, but not identical, to section 1 of the Sherman
Act. Both section 1 and the Cartwright Act declare certain "trusts" to
be illegal, and both require that a combination, agreement or conspiracy between two or more persons exist before a violation can be

found." The language of the two statutes, however, is noticeably different. Section 1 broadly declares that "[e]very contract, combination
...or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce... is... illegal.""s
The Cartwright Act, on the other hand, phrases its prohibitions in
much narrower terms by listing several specific forms of illegal combinations.8 2 Despite their apparent differences, however, the effect of
the two statutes has been substantially the same.
The California Supreme Court had held until recently that federal cases interpreting the Sherman Act were applicable to interpretation of the Cartwright Act. 3 The court based this holding on the
rationale that the Cartwright Act was patterned after the Sherman
Act, and both statutes have their roots in the common law.8 4 This

statutory construction was expressly overruled by the court in State ex
rel. Van De Kamp v. Texaco, Inc. 5 In Texaco, the California Supreme

Court undertook an extensive historical and textual analysis of the
78. 15 U.S.C. § 1. "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign
nations, is declared to be illegal." Id.
79. 15 U.S.C. § 2.
80. The Cartwright Act, however, has no § 2 equivalent. Monopolization, attempts to
monopolize, or combinations or conspiracies to monopolize are not practices specifically
prohibited by the Act. Thus, concerted activity between two or more persons is always
required for a Cartwright Act violation to exist. See generally Cowan, supra note 55.
81. 15 U.S.C. § 1. Although the Sherman Act by its terms appears to apply to all
contracts that restrain trade, it has been held to invalidate only those contracts that unreasonably restrain trade. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911). See infra text
accompanying notes 89-94.

82. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16720. See Moses Lasky, Folklore and Myth in Judicial
Opinions-Some Reflections Inspired by Texaco-Getty, 20 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 591 (1987).
83. Marin County Bd. of Realtors, Inc. v. Palsson, 549 P.2d 833, 835 (Cal. 1976);
Corwin v. Los Angeles Newspaper Serv. Bureau, Inc., 484 P.2d 953, 959 (Cal. 1971); Chicago Title Ins. Co. v. Great West. Fin. Corp., 444 P.2d 481, 487 (Cal. 1968).

84. Palsson, 549 P.2d at 835; Corwin, 484 P.2d at 959; Chicago Title Ins. Co., 444 P.2d
at 487.
85. 762 P.2d 385 (Cal. 1988).
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Cartwright Act and concluded that the statute was not patterned after
the 1890 Sherman Act, but rather the 1889 Texas antitrust act, which
had been expressly rejected by the United States Senate as an amendment to the then-pending Sherman antitrust bill.86 The court therefore concluded that judicial interpretation of the Sherman Act, "while
is not directly probative of the Cartwright drafters'
often helpful,
87
intent.
Arguably, the California Supreme Court's decision in Texaco
somewhat weakens previous decisions that relied on construction of
the Sherman Act. However, the Texaco court did not expressly overrule any of these decisions. Furthermore, Texaco was an antitrust case
involving a challenged merger. The court, applying its new rule of
construction, only held that mergers could not be attacked under the
Cartwright Act, since there was neither express language in the Cartwright Act regarding mergers nor any indication that the drafters intended for the law to apply to such activity.88 Thus, while Texaco
makes clear that the Cartwright Act does not cover mergers, it still
leaves the law of other anticompetitive restraints untouched and open
to application of Sherman Act precedents.
B.

Practices Condemned by the Cartwright Act as it Pertains to the
Cravens Antitrust Suit

In interpreting antitrust laws, courts have generally classified
trade restraints into two categories. The first category consists of violations that are illegal per se. The per se doctrine provides that the
mere existence of a certain trade practice is sufficient to establish that
and therefore illegal, restraint on competition exan unreasonable,
ists. 89 Practices that are considered per se violations of antitrust law
are illegal despite any claimed benefits produced by the restraint, and
no further inquiry by the trier of fact is necessary if such a practice is
determined to have occurred. 9° Price fixing, horizontal territorial restrictions, some tying arrangements and exclusionary or coercive
group boycotts have been deemed by both federal and state courts to
be per se violations of antitrust law. 9
86. Id. at 392-93.
87. Id. at 395.
88. Id. at 390-95.
89. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 218, 221 (1940); Kolling v.
Dow Jones & Co., 187 Cal. Rptr. 797, 806 (Ct. App. 1982).
90. Julian 0. Von Kalinowski & John J. Hanson, The California Antitrust Laws: A
Comparison With the FederalAntitrust Laws, 6 UCLA L. REV. 533, 541-42 (1959).
91. Cowan, supra note 55, at 248-51.
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All trade restraints not deemed illegal per se under antitrust law
are subject to a "rule of reason" standard. 92 Under this standard, a
particular trade restraint is illegal only if the trier of fact finds it to be
"unreasonably anticompetitive." 93 A court will usually consider several factors in determining whether a restraint is reasonable or not,
including the type of business in which the restraint has been applied,
the nature and effects of the restraint and the history of the restraint,
including the reasons for its adoption.94 Practices analyzed under the
rule of reason include exclusive dealing agreements and vertical territorial restrictions.95
1. Price Fixing

The Cravens antitrust suit claimed that Ticketmaster and BASS
have separately conspired with the individual promoters and venue
officials to fix service charges on ticket purchases. As discussed
above, price fixing is among those business practices that are illegal
per se under both federal and state antitrust law.9 6 In United States v.
Socony-Vacuum Oil Co.,97 the Supreme Court declared:
[Flor over forty years this Court has consistently and without deviation adhered to the principle that price-fixing agreements are unlawful per se under the Sherman Act and that no showing of socalled competitive abuses or evils which those agreements were
designed to eliminate or alleviate may be interposed as a defense
.... Any combination which98tampers with price structures is engaged in an unlawful activity.
Similarly, the California Supreme Court has interpreted the Cartwright Act as prohibiting the tampering with or fixing of prices. 99
Prices must be determined by the "interplay of the economic forces of
supply and demand."'" Furthermore, the court has held that the per
se rule applies whether the price-fixing scheme is between competitors
or businesses at different economic levels, and regardless of whether
92. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
93. Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918). "The true test of
legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby
promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition."
Id.
94. Id.; United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 607 (1972). In practice, the most
important considerations are the market power and size of the parties to the agreement
and the observed and/or predicted effect of the agreement. See, e.g., Federal Trade
Comm'n v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986).
95. Cowan, supra note 55, at 250-51; Fontana & Hunsader, supra note 76, at 6-7.
96. See supra text accompanying note 91.
97. 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
98. Id. at 221.
99. Mailand v. Burckle, 572 P.2d 1142, 1147 (Cal. 1978).
100. Id. (quoting Speegle v. Board of Fire Underwriters, 172 P.2d 867, 873 (Cal. 1946)).
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the restraint is reasonable or not.'' In California, plaintiffs in a private state antitrust action will succeed by proving (1) a conspiracy to
fix prices in violation of the antitrust laws, (2) that prices were fixed
pursuant to the conspiracy and (3) that as a result of the conspiracy,
the plaintiff purchased products at prices which were higher than they
10 2
should have been.
The Plaintiffs' Complaint in Cravens alleges that the ticketing
services have entered into vertical price fixing schemes 0 3 with promoters and venues, in which they have agreed to fix the fees charged
to ticket buyers for using the ticketing services. 1°4 Ticketmaster and
BASS service charges often vary from one event to another at the
same venue and sometimes vary among tickets for the same show,105
although the cost of selling a certain venue's tickets is presumably the
same for almost any event at that venue. This fact indicates that these
charges are not being determined on the basis of actual costs. Significantly, in various contexts, both Ticketmaster and BASS have essentially conceded that their service charges are set by the various venues
and promoters with whom they contract. For example, Ticketmaster's chairman, Fred Rosen, has stated that "[Ticketmaster]
do[es] not control the price of the product.... We provide a service,
and the fee we charge for that service is set by those who own the
building where the event takes place."' 6 Similarly, BASS has admitted
that promoters have at times dictated maximum service charge
amounts.0 7
BASS and Ticketmaster's business relationship to promoters and
venues is one of distributor to supplier. Ticketmaster and BASS enter
into agreements with the promoters and venues which provide that
Ticketmaster or BASS will be the exclusive non-box office distributors
101. Id.
102. Rosack v. Volvo of Am. Corp., 182 Cal. Rptr. 800, 806 (Ct. App. 1982).
103. An agreement is "vertical" when it is between businesses at different levels of
competition, such as an agreement between a manufacturer and a distributor.
104. Plaintiffs' Complaint, 60, Cravens (No. 943-387).
105. For example, Ticketmaster increased its service charges for arena shows by the
rock group U2 in Worcester, MA and Providence, RI from $4.25 to $4.75 per ticket plus a
$1.80 handling fee on each ticket order. Mohl, supra note 12. BASS service charges for
April 1994 shows by Pink Floyd at the Oakland Coliseum provide an even starker illustration. A $60 ticket included additional service charges of as much as $8, while tickets for the
same shows priced $32.50 and $22.50 included additional service charges of only $5.75.
Peter Stack, The Dark Side of Pink Floyd Ticket Prices, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 24, 1994, at E2.
It appears to be a common practice to increase service charges for popular, high-demand
events.
106. Philips, supra note 18 (emphasis added); see also Rosen, supra note 27 ("All Ticketmaster charges are set by contract with the arenas or venues ... .
107. Salner, supra note 48.
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of the promoters' and venues' product-entertainment event tickets.
A crucial aspect of these business relationships, for the purposes of
price fixing, is that the promoters and venues, through their agreements with each other and the event performers, set the prices for
tickets and apparently have title to the tickets even after they are distributed to the ticketing service. °8 Ticketmaster and BASS assert that
they do not actually purchase blocks of tickets from these parties and
then resell the tickets.' 9 Rather, Ticketmaster and BASS maintain
they provide a service that sells and distributes tickets more efficiently
and conveniently, and all tickets that they fail to sell are returned to
the supplier." 0
If the transactions between the promoters and venues and Ticketmaster-BASS are outright sales, in which Ticketmaster and BASS
have title to the tickets and incur the absolute obligation to pay for
unsold tickets, the adding of an agreed upon service charge to the
ticket price by the promoters and venues is a form of price fixing commonly referred to as "resale price maintenance." Resale price maintenance exists where a seller of goods is attempting to fix the price at
which his buyer resells the goods to another buyer."' Because such a
restraint is thought'to have a destructive effect on competition, resale
price maintenance is illegal per se under both section 1 of the Sherman Act

2

and the Cartwright Act." 3 Schemes to fix both minimum

4
and maximum resale prices are subject to this rule."
In Ryko Manufacturing Co. v. Eden Services, the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals outlined the requirements an antitrust plaintiff must
satisfy to establish a case of resale price maintenance. The plaintiff
must demonstrate that (1) the manufacturer has contracted, combined
or conspired (2) with a separate economic entity (3) to set the price at
108. Reply Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendant Ticketmaster-Southern California, Inc.'s Demurrer and Motion to Strike, at 8-9, Cravens (No.
943-387) [hereinafter Reply Memorandum].
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Ryko Mfg. Co. v. Eden Servs., 823 F.2d 1215, 1222 (8th Cir. 1987).
112. Id.; Continental Television, Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36, 51 n.18 (1977).
113. See Kolling v. Dow Jones & Co., 187 Cal. Rptr. 797 (Ct. App. 1982) (newspaper's
resale pricing policy with distributors and coercion enforcing the pricing structure constituted illegal price fixing under the Cartwright Act). See also R.E. Spriggs Co. v. Adolph
Coors Co., 156 Cal. Rptr. 738 (Ct. App. 1979) (program of resale price maintenance enforced through refusals to deal and distributor territorial restrictions held to be an illegal
vertical price-fixing arrangement).
114. Ryko, 823 F.2d at 1222; see also Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co.,
220 U.S. 373 (1911) (fixing minimum resale price illegal per se); Albrecht v. Herald Co.,
390 U.S. 145 (1968) (fixing maximum resale price illegal per se).
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which the products are resold (4) in an independent commercial transaction with a subsequent purchaser.115
Where the transaction, however, is not an outright sale but involves a consignment or agency relationship, the agreement by which
the price is set does not receive illegal per se treatment. In United
States v. General Electric Co.,116 the Court held that a manufacturer
was not guilty of vertical price fixing where it sold patented lamps to
the consumer through a network of distributors acting as sales agents
of the manufacturer and fixed the prices at which these agents sold the
goods. 1 7 However, a "genuine contract of agency" must exist between the manufacturer and the distributor for this exception to apply
and the manufacturer must retain title to the goods sold through the
distributor.' 18 Under this standard, the Court found that General
Electric's consignment plan, whereby the company fixed the price of
lamps sold by its retailers to the public, was legal under section 1 of
the Sherman Act.'

19

Almost forty years after General Electric, the Supreme Court, in
Simpson v. Union Oil Co. of Cal.,12° refined and limited this agency
exception. Union Oil sold gasoline nationally through over four thousand retail service stations. 21 It used a consignment system under
which it determined the prices at which the stations sold the gasoline,
and it also retained title to the gasoline until it was sold at the stations'
pumps.' 22 The station operators, however, were responsible for all
losses associated with the sale of the "consigned" gasoline. 23 The
Court held that this consignment technique was a scheme used to disguise an extensive gasoline distribution system that involved illegally
fixed resale prices.' 24 Looking beyond the mere form of the "consignment" agreement, the Court held that there was not a genuine agency
relationship between the service stations and Union Oil that would
exempt the arrangement from per se treatment. 25
The Court in Simpson set forth several substantive criteria which
a court is to consider in deciding whether a relationship is actually a
genuine agency or actually an unreasonable vertical price restriction.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Ryko, 823 F.2d at 1222-23.
272 U.S. 476 (1926).
Id. at 488.
Id.
Id.
377 U.S. 13 (1964).
Id. at 15 n.1.
Id. at 15.
Id.
Id. at 21.
Id. at 21-22.
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Foremost of these criteria is the allocation of business risks between a
distributor and its supplier. 1 26 As the court in Ryko explained:
If a distributor deals with his supplier as an "independent businessman" who bears most or all of the risks on transactions with purchasers, then an agency or consignment agreement is ineffective to
insulate the manufacturer from antitrust liability for fixing resale
prices. . . .However, where the manufacturer bears the financial
risks of transactions with the customers and continues to retain "title, dominion and control over its goods," then it is127
likely that the
distributor is merely an agent for the manufacturer.
Thus, Simpson mandates that a court focus on the substance of the
distributor-supplier relationship, rather than the parties' subjective intent, to determine whether an agency relationship exists.
Moreover, Simpson has been read by courts and commentators as
limiting the General Electric agency theory (i.e., all consignment sales
are legal per se) to sales transactions involving patented goods. 12 8 The
Court in Simpson noted that although the General Electric holding
was not limited to patented articles, the General Electric Court particularly relied on the fact that patent rights have long included licenses
"to make, use and vend" the patented article "for any royalty or upon
any condition the performance of which is reasonably within the reward which the patentee by the grant of the patent is entitled to secure."' 129 The Court in Simpson also pointed out that prior to the
General Electric decision, price fixing in the marketing of patented
articles had been condoned.3 The Simpson Court accordingly concluded that the patents involved were the Court's "ratio decidendi" for
finding the consignment system lawful in General Electric.1 3 1 Thus,
after Simpson, ostensible agency transactions in non-patented goods
essentially receive a rule of reason analysis, focusing in particular on
whether the alleged agent bears significant economic risk in the sale of
13 2
the consigned goods.
A recent case in which the business relationship at issue closely
resembles the situation in the Cravens antitrust suit is Illinois Corpo126. See id. at 20.
127. Ryko Mfg. Co. v. Eden Servs., 823 F.2d 1215, 1223 (8th Cir. 1987) (citations
omitted).

128. See, e.g., 8 PHILIP AREEDA,
CIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION

ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRIN-

1621 (1989).

129. Simpson v. Union Oil of Cal., 377 U.S. 13, 23 (1964) (quoting United States v.
General Electric Co., 272 U.S. 476, 489 (1926)).
130. Id. at 24.
131. Id.

132. See 7 PHILIP AREEDA,

ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES

AND THEIR APPLICATION
1473 (1986). Of course, once a court finds that a genuine
agency relationship exists it will also necessarily conclude that the vertical price restraint
imposed on the agent is reasonable, and therefore, legal.
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rate Travel, Inc. v. American Airlines, Inc.'3 3 In this case, a travel

agent brought an action against American Airlines, alleging that the
airline's prohibition against discount advertising by ticket sellers was a
form of resale price maintenance. 3 After conceding that such a ban
on price advertising is a form of unlawful resale price maintenance,
the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals asserted that per se illegality of
this practice does not apply if the ticket distributor is a genuine agent
of the airline. 135 Using a Simpson economic risk analysis, the court
concluded that the plaintiff was in fact an agent of the defendant airline, and therefore, the airline was not guilty of resale price maintenance. 136 The court was persuaded by the fact that the airline set the
price for each ticket and the travel agent carried no inventory and
could book apace on flights only by requesting it from the airline's
computer. 137 Furthermore, the airline retained title to tickets that
were provided to the travel agent, and therefore took the risk for unsold seats.' 38 Under a genuine agency relationship, the airline could
not only decide the price at which it sold its tickets, it also could set
the rate at which its travel agents charged consumers for using their
services to reserve and purchase the airline's tickets. 39
The travel agent also argued that American's own reservation
and ticketing service, which directly competed with the travel agents'
services, made the airline's ban on travel agent discount advertising
illegal per se.' 4 ° The agent claimed the ban in the context of this dual
distribution system constituted "horizontal" price fixing. 41 The court
rejected this argument, reasoning that such a dual distribution system
tends to encourage, rather than discourage, competition. 42 Furthermore, the court stated that dual distribution does not make a business
practice per se illegal where the practice is lawful if the manufacturer
43
is not selling directly to customers.
Although Illinois Corporate Travel is not binding authority, the
similarity of the facts suggest that a court could find Ticketmaster and
BASS to be genuine agents of the venues and promoters with whom
133. 889 F.2d 751 (7th Cir. 1989); 806 F.2d 722 (7th Cir. 1986).
134. 889 F.2d at 752; 806 F.2d at 724.
135. Id.
136. 889 F.2d at 753-54; 806 F.2d at 725-26.
137. 889 F.2d at 752; 806 F.2d at 725.
138. Id.
139. 889 F.2d at 752; 806 F.2d at 728-29.
140. Illinois Corporate Travel, Inc. v. American Airlines, Inc., 889 F.2d 751, 753 (7th
Cir. 1989).
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
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they contract. The existence of such a relationship would make the
fixing of ticketing service fees by venues and promoters permissible.
The Simpson and Illinois Corporate Travel opinions both emphasize

that the determination of which party bears the financial risks in customer transactions plays an important role in defining an agency relationship. If the supplier bears little or no risk in the sale of its product
to the consumer, its relationship with its distributor is less likely to be
considered a genuine principal-agent relationship.
Like the travel agent in Illinois Corporate Travel, Ticketmaster

claims that it does not set the price for tickets which it sells, nor does it
have title to these tickets, and all event tickets which Ticketmaster
fails to sell are returned to the venue and promoter. 144 Indeed, anyone who is familiar with purchasing tickets to an entertainment event
knows that the same tickets available through a computerized ticketing service are also available at the venue box office, much like a traveler knows that he can purchase a ticket for the same airplane seat
through a travel agent or from the airline directly. Since the ticketing
service does not purchase tickets from venues and promoters for resale purposes, the ticketing service assumes no risk in unsold tickets,
and the service charges received by Ticketmaster and BASS (as set by
the venues and promoters) for every ticket sale are essentially sales
commissions which courts have consistently upheld as lawful price restrictions under antitrust law.
Under Simpson and its progeny, a genuine agency or consignment agreement will insulate a manufacturer or supplier from vertical
price fixing liability if the supplier bears most of the economic risk on
transactions with consumers. Such is the case here, where the venues
and promoters bear the risk on tickets sold through Ticketmaster and
BASS. Given the above considerations, it is likely that a court would
reject the price fixing claim of the Cravens plaintiffs.
2. Horizontal Division of Market

The major claim made exclusively against Ticketmaster and
BASS in the Cravens suit is that the licensing agreement between the
companies allocates the California market so that the companies do
not directly compete with each other. 45 The agreement allegedly is a
horizontal territorial limitation. This is prohibited by the Cartwright
Act under subsection 16720(a) as a combination for the purpose of
creating or carrying out restrictions in trade or commerce. 46
144. Reply Memorandum, supra note 108, at 8-9.
145. Plaintiffs' Complaint,
23, 33, 65-66, Cravens (No. 943-387).
146. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16720(a).
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Although there are no California cases directly on point, 47 the United
States Supreme Court has held that territorial limitations and division
of markets between competitors are illegal per se under the Sherman
Act. 148 In United States v. Topco Associates, Inc.,' 49 a cooperative
buying association of small and medium-sized independent supermarket chains allocated territories to each member.15 0 Within each territory, each member had exclusive licenses to sell the association's
private label brands.' 51 Each member essentially had a veto over admission of new members into the association, and expansion into another member's territory to sell Topco brand products required the
other members' consent. 152 The Supreme Court held that Topco's
scheme of dividing markets among its members and allowing members to control actual or potential competition in their respective territories constituted a horizontal restraint of trade and a per se violation
of section 1 of the Sherman Act.' 5 3 The Court so held despite Topco's
contention that such practices actually increased competition by enabling members to compete successfully with larger supermarket
chains. 54
The Topco holding was consistent with the Court's holding in
United States v. Sealy, Inc., 55 decided five years earlier. In Sealy, a
corporation (Sealy) licensed manufacturers of mattresses and bedding
to make and sell products using the Sealy trademark.1 56 Sealy was
primarily owned and controlled by its licensees. 57 The corporation
agreed with the licensees not to license other manufacturers to sell
Sealy-brand products in a designated territory in exchange for the
promise that licensees not expand sales beyond the respective territories assigned by Sealy.' 58 The Court held that these horizontal territorial restraints were a per se violation of the Sherman Act.' 5 9
147. However, in LaFortune v. Ebie, 102 Cal. Rptr. 588, 590 (Ct. App. 1972), a California Court of Appeal approvingly cited the Supreme Court per se rule against horizontal
territorial limitations without directly holding that the per se rule was applicable under the
Cartwright Act.
148. White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963); United States v. Topco
Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
149. 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
150. Id. at 598, 601.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 602.
153. Id. at 608.
154. Id. at 605, 610.
155. 388 U.S. 350 (1967).
156. Id. at 351.
157. Id. at 352-53.
158. Id. at 352.
159. Id. at 357-58.
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Just recently, in Palmer v. BRG of Georgia, Inc.,"6 the Supreme
Court found illegal an arrangement that appears strikingly similar to
the Ticketmaster-BASS licensing agreement. In Palmer, Harcourt
Brace Jovanovich Legal and Professional Publications (HBJ) and
BRG of Georgia, Inc. (BRG) were the two main providers of bar examination review courses in Georgia.'61 From 1977 to 1979, the two
companies were in direct, and often intense competition. 62 In 1980,
they entered into an agreement whereby HBJ gave BRG an exclusive
license to market HBJ's material in Georgia. 163 The companies also
agreed that HBJ would not compete with BRG in Georgia and BRG
would not compete with HBJ outside of Georgia.' 64 The agreement
gave HBJ a share of BRG's revenues. 65 Immediately after the agreement went into effect, the price of BRG's course was increased from
$150 to $400.166 In a per curiam opinion quoting Topco, the Court
held that this agreement was an illegal per se allocation of markets
among competitors. 67 The Court stressed that such agreements not
to compete are anticompetitive regardless of whether the parties split
a market within which both do business or whether 1they
merely re68
other.
the
for
another
and
one
for
market
one
serve
Based on the foregoing, it appears that BASS and Ticketmaster
have unlawfully divided the California market in order to restrain
competition. Although they are separate corporations, Ticketmaster,
like HBJ in Palmer, has licensed BASS to use its computer ticketing
software system and its name since 1986.169 The licensing agreement
apparently provides that BASS will operate without competition in
Northern California while, in return, BASS will not compete with
Ticketmaster in Southern California. 7 ° Thus, like the defendants in
Topco, Sealy, and Palmer,Ticketmaster and BASS are major competitors who have agreed to split a market into exclusive territories in
order to allow each company to operate in the market without fear of
competition from the other. Because such practices are deemed ille160. 111 S. Ct. 401 (1990) (per curiam).
161. Id. at 401.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 401-02.
167. Id. at 402-03.
168. Id. at 403.
169. Pender, supra note 22.
170. Id. The Notz settlement agreement, however, provides that the licensing agreement will not be enforced for the next four years, and Ticketmaster and BASS will not
prohibit each other from competing in California. See supra notes 5, 33.
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gal per se under federal antitrust law, it is probably irrelevant in determining Cartwright Act liability whether the BASS-Ticketmaster
agreement is "reasonable" or may have a beneficial effect on competition. Nevertheless, the fact that these territorial limitations have had
a detrimental effect on competition in the ticketing services market in
California makes it all the more persuasive that such a practice should
be deemed illegal per se under the Cartwright Act. Thus, it is likely
that a California court, either using federal case law as a guide, or
applying the Cartwright Act's underlying rationale of protecting competition, would find the licensing agreement between BASS and Ticketmaster to be a per se violation of the Act.
3. Exclusive Dealing in Restraint of Trade

The last major Cartwright Act claim in the Cravens complaint involves the long-term exclusive dealing agreements Ticketmaster and
BASS have with the venues and promoters. Specifically, the complaint alleges that these agreements, which provide that the venue or
promoter will exclusively use Ticketmaster or BASS as its computerized ticketing service, substantially foreclose competition in the ticketing services market.' 7 ' This enables Ticketmaster and BASS to
increase their market power and control over the market.172
As discussed above, exclusive dealing agreements are covered
under two separate sections of the Cartwright Act. 7 3 Section 16720 is
the more general of the two provisions, prohibiting any combination
which creates or carries out restrictions in trade or commerce. 74 Section 16727 specifically prohibits exclusive dealing agreements which
"substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any
line of trade or commerce in any section of the State.' 75 Unlike price
fixing and horizontal territorial limitations, both federal and California courts do not treat exclusive dealing agreements as illegal per se,
but instead analyze them on a case-by-case basis. 7 6 That is, to prove
an exclusive dealing arrangement unlawful under antitrust law, the
plaintiff must show that the agreement was intended to, or actually
171. Plaintiffs' Complaint,
60-61, 64-66, Cravens (No. 943-387).
172. Id. IT 60-61.
173. See supra text accompanying note 76.
174. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16720(a).
175. Id. § 16727.
176. See Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320 (1961); Standard Oil Co.
v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949); Redwood Theatres, Inc. v. Festival Enters., Inc., 248
Cal. Rptr. 189 (Ct. App. 1988); Kolling v. Dow Jones & Co., 187 Cal. Rptr. 797 (Ct. App.
1982); Dayton Time Lock Serv., Inc. v. Silent Watchman Corp., 124 Cal. Rptr. 678 (Ct.
App. 1975).
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did, substantially lessen competition. 1 77 Courts have applied a rule of
reason analysis because they have recognized that vertical non-price
restrictions 78may in some situations promote interbrand
1
competition.
The Supreme Court has developed two tests to determine
whether an exclusive dealing agreement "substantially lessens competition" under section 3 of the Clayton Act (section 16727's federal
counterpart). 1 79 The first test is the "quantitative substantiality" test,
originally set forth by the Court in Standard Oil Co. v. United States
(Standard Stations).18° This test holds an exclusive dealing agreement

illegal where the practical effect of such an agreement is to foreclose

competition in a substantial share of the affected line of commerce. 1 8 '

competition is irrelevant
The exclusive agreement's probable effect1on
82
test.
substantiality
under the quantitative
The second, more comprehensive test used by the Court is the
"qualitative substantiality" test. This test allows a court to consider
both the probable and actual effect of an exclusive agreement on competition. The qualitative substantiality test was originally formulated
in Tampa Electric Co. v. Nashville Coal Co.,183 in which the Court
listed and discussed several major factors that must be considered in
deciding whether an exclusive dealing arrangement violates antitrust
laws. First, any controversy over the line of commerce (i.e., the type of

goods or services involved) must be determined on the basis of the
peculiar facts of the case.' 84 Second, the relevant market must be defined in order to determine whether there is a connection between the

threatened or actual foreclosure of competition and the affected mar177. Kolling, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 809.
178. Fontana & Hunsader, supra note 76, at 6; Continental Television, Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 56-59 (1977).
179. Ch. 323 § 3, 38 Stat. 731 (1914) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1988)).
The concern of both § 3 of the Clayton Act and § 16727 of the Cartwright Act is on the
effect an exclusive dealing contract has on downstream markets. Thus, both statutes prohibit sellers from requiring that buyers refrain from dealing in the goods of other sellers
where such a requirement would substantially lessen competition. Because the venues/
promoters are not conditioning their sales of tickets to Ticketmaster and BASS on the
ticketing services' agreement not to buy tickets from other venues and promoters, arguably
the Clayton and Cartwright Acts' prohibitions against exclusive dealing do not apply.
However, when viewed in the context of the sale of ticketing services instead of the sale of
tickets, the positions of buyers and sellers are reversed-the venues and promoters are the
buyers and Ticketmaster and BASS are the sellers-and therefore the prohibitions against
exclusive dealing that restrains trade should be considered applicable.
180. 337 U.S. 293 (1949).
181. Id. at 314.
182. Id.
183. Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320 (1961).
184. Id. at 327.
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ket. 18 5 Finally, the competition foreclosed by the exclusive agreement
must be found to constitute a substantial share of the relevant mar-

ket. 186 To determine what constitutes a "substantial share," the Court
stated:
[I]t is necessary to weigh the probable effect of the contract on the
relevant area of effective competition, taking into account the relative strength of the parties, the proportionate volume of commerce
involved in relation to the total volume of commerce in the relevant
market area, and the probable immediate and future effects which
preemption of that 187
share of the market might have on effective
competition therein.

The Court has consistently asserted that the relevant market is
the "prime factor" used to determine the question of whether an exclusive contract forecloses a substantial share of the line of commerce

involved.' 88 Accordingly, defining the relevant market affected by the
Ticketmaster-BASS exclusive dealing agreements is the key to determining the legality of the agreements. The more expansive the relevant market, the less likely an antitrust plaintiff will be successful in
proving that the exclusive dealing agreements substantially foreclose
competition in that market. 8 9
The Cravens plaintiffs, not surprisingly, defined the relevant market more narrowly than the defendants. The Plaintiffs' Complaint defines the defendants' relevant service market to include "retail sales of
tickets to the public, other than at the box office, for entertainment

events" in California. 19° This market definition essentially includes
only sales of tickets through computerized ticketing services. On the
other hand, BASS and Ticketmaster apparently define their relevant
185. Id.
186. Id. at 328.
187. Id. at 329. Justice O'Connor, in her concurring opinion in Jefferson Parish Hospital Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 32-47 (1983), provided a succinct summary of the
Court's present position towards exclusive dealing contracts:
In determining whether an exclusive-dealing contract is unreasonable, the proper
focus is on the structure of the market for the products or services in questionthe number of sellers and buyers in the market, the volume of their business, and
the ease with which buyers and sellers can redirect their purchases or sales to
others. Exclusive dealing is an unreasonable restraint of trade only when a significant fraction of buyers and sellers are frozen out of a market by the exclusive
deal. When the sellers of services are numerous and mobile, and the number of
buyers is large, exclusive-dealing arrangements of narrow scope pose no threat of
adverse economic consequences. To the contrary, they may be substantially
procompetitive by ensuring stable markets and encouraging long-term, mutually
advantageous business relationships.
Id. at 45 (citation omitted).
188. Tampa Electric, 365 U.S. at 329.
189. See, e.g., id. at 330-33.
190. Plaintiffs' Complaint, 67, Cravens (No. 943-387) (emphasis added).
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market to include the retail sale of all entertainment tickets in California, including box office sales.'
This relevant market definition
would include the retail ticket sales of countless small and independ-

ent entertainment venues which, because of their size and/or limited
financial resources, only sell their tickets at their respective box offices. Furthermore, this market definition includes the box office
ticket sales of movie theaters and sports stadiums, which constitute a
huge percentage of overall retail ticket sales in California.' 92 Under
this expansive market definition, it is less likely that the exclusive

dealing agreements between the defendants could be found to foreclose a substantial share of the relevant market.
However, given the specialized role a computerized ticketing service has in the retail ticket sales market, it is more likely that a court
would adopt the plaintiffs' more restrictive definition of the relevant
market. The problem with the defendants' expansive definition is that
computerized ticketing services seek to supplement, not supplant, box
office ticket sales. In other words, computerized ticketing services are

not in direct competition with venue box offices. 93 The purpose of
BASS and Ticketmaster's exclusive agreements is not to gain control
of the retail sale of all entertainment tickets, but rather to gain control

only of the computerized ticketing services market.' 94
191. See Judith Green, BASS Fights Ticket Fee Limits, S.J. MERCURY NEWS, Apr. 4,
1992, at 1A (BASS fact sheet claims that BASS-Ticketmaster outlets sold less than 6% of
the 150 million entertainment tickets sold in California in 1991). See also Hull, supra note
45 (BASS arguing that it has far less impact on ticket business than its critics claim).
192. It is worth noting, however, that Ticketmaster now sells advance tickets for General Cinema movie theaters throughout Los Angeles. Alan Citron, Ticketmaster Lands
Role in a Remake of Going to the Movies, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 6, 1992, at D1.
193. Granted, one of the effects of the exclusive dealing agreements is to reduce ticket
sales at the box offices of the venues that are parties to these agreements. But venues
certainly would not enter into these agreements if they felt that their respective box offices
were in actual competition with BASS or Ticketmaster. Thus, each exclusive agreement
should be seen as establishing a dual distribution partnership between the computerized
ticketing service and the individual venue box office, not as a zero-sum game between the
parties.
194. Guidelines issued in 1992 by the Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission on horizontal mergers (which replaced very similar 1984 Department of Justice
guidelines) also suggest this relevant market definition.
The guidelines view a market as a product or group of products and a geographical
area in which a firm operating as a monopolist could impose a "small but significant and
nontransitory" increase in price (defined as an increase of 5% lasting for the foreseeable
future) and still operate profitably if the terms of sale of all other potentially competitive
products are held constant. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE & FEDERAL TRADE COMM'N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES § 1.0 (Apr. 2, 1992).
From a product standpoint, the base market is that of the product of the firm and
those products viewed as close substitutes by buyers. If the market price rise would cause
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By adopting the plaintiffs' definition of the relevant market, a

court would also necessarily find that the competition foreclosed by
the defendants' exclusive dealing agreements constitutes a substantial
share of the market, and therefore these agreements are prohibited by

the Cartwright Act. In Standard Stations, the Supreme Court, using
the quantitative substantiality test, held that the defendant's exclusive
gasoline requirements contracts with sixteen percent of the service
stations in a seven-state Western area violated section 3 of the Clayton
Act. 195 In this situation, the exclusive contracts resulted in the defendant selling 6.7% of the total taxable gallonage in the area. 1 96 The
Court reasoned that these exclusive contracts created a "potential
clog" on competition, which, were it to become actual, would impede
97
a substantial amount of competitive activity in the relevant market.'
By comparison, BASS sells over seventy-five percent of all nonbox office tickets in Northern California,' 98 and it sells more tickets
than all the Northern California box offices combined. 99 Ticketmaster presently claims ninety-five percent of San Diego's non-box
purchasers to substitute away from the product of the hypothetical monopolist, these substitute products would be added to the market. Id. § 1.1.
Applying these guidelines to the Cravens context, it is indisputable that Ticketmaster
and BASS over the last several years have increased their service charges at a consistently
high rate. See supra text accompanying note 29. Venue box offices, where service charges
do not apply, are the only retail ticket distribution source that constitute a close substitute
to Ticketmaster and BASS. If venue box offices are part of the relevant product market,
one would expect to see consumers increasingly purchasing their tickets at the box office
with every increase in Ticketmaster or BASS service charges. However, this is clearly not
the case. Although data is not available, it is also unlikely that a significant number of
ticket purchasers are electing alternative entertainment to the venue events.
The geographic component of the relevant market analysis is similar to the product
component. Starting with the hypothetical monopolist's current geographic market, the
guidelines test whether an approximate 5% price increase would cause buyers to begin
purchasing from suppliers in more remote locations. Id. § 1.2. Again, it is clear in the
Cravens situation that consumers for the most part do not purchase their tickets from the
typically more remote venue box office location in response to increases in service charges
by Ticketmaster or BASS.
These steps bring into the equation current competitors and those who would compete
after the price rise. Id. § 1.3. The final step in the relevant market analysis is to measure
the hypothetical monopolist's new market share after the effects of the price increase on
product and geographic market expansion. Id. § 1.4. As discussed supra, it is clear that
Ticketmaster's and BASS's respective market shares have not decreased in response to
their increasing of service charges. If anything, the opposite has occurred. These considerations therefore justify treating computerized ticketing services and venue box offices as
separate and distinct markets under the Justice Department guidelines as well.
195. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 295-96, 314 (1949).
196. Id. at 295.
197. Id. at 314.
198. Plaintiffs' Complaint, [ 17, Cravens (No. 943-387).
199. Hull, supra note 45.
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office ticket sales.20 0 Moreover, Ticketmaster and BASS are the exclusive computerized ticketing services for the three major live entertainment promoters in California, and for almost all the major
sporting and entertainment venues in the state, including the venues
20 1
which were specifically named as defendants in the Cravens suit.
These exclusive dealing agreements usually run three to five years in
length.2 °2 The practical effect of these agreements on competition in
the computerized ticketing services market is that Ticketmaster and
BASS presently have a virtual monopoly of the market. Furthermore,
no significant competitor has emerged since Ticketmaster bought out
Ticketron in 1991, and prior to that time, Ticketron essentially served
as the only major competitor ever to challenge Ticketmaster.
This consistent lack of competition in the relevant market is presumably caused by the severe entry barriers created by the long-term
exclusive dealing agreements. Using the Court's analysis in Standard
Stations or Tampa Electric, these facts should lead to the conclusion
that competition has been substantially foreclosed in the relevant market by the Ticketmaster-BASS exclusive agreements. The agreements
have affected a large portion of the relevant market by creating an
actual, not potential, "clog" on competition. Sections 16727 and 16720
of the Cartwright Act mandate that such exclusive dealing agreements
be declared unlawful and void.20 3
C.

Secret Rebate Claim Under the Unfair Practices Act

One of the other major claims against the Cravens defendants is
that Ticketmaster and BASS allegedly pay secret rebates to the promoters and venues to entice and secure exclusive dealing agreements. 20 4 This claim was not brought under the Cartwright Act, but
under the Unfair Practices Act (UPA). °5
200. Neil Morgan, You Can UnderstandOur Culture by Ticket, THE SAN DIEGO UNIONFeb. 20, 1994, at A-2. Although Ticketmaster's market share of non-box office
ticket sales in Southern California could not be found, it is known that Ticketmaster sells
approximately $1 billion annually in tickets nationwide, including $130 million in sales in
Southern California in 1991. See Deborah Russell, Ticketmaster is Target of 2 Class-Action
Antitrust Suits, BILLBOARD, June 27, 1992, at 10. This means that Southern California accounts for approximately 13% of Ticketmaster's national ticket sales.
201. See Plaintiffs' Complaint,
17-18, 21, 27, 29-30, Cravens (No. 943-387).
202. See Pender, supra note 22.
203. In Standard Stations, the Court asserted that since the defendant's exclusive contracts fell within the narrower prohibitions of § 3 of the Clayton Act, it was unnecessary to
consider whether the contracts also violated § 1 of the Sherman Act. Standard Oil Co. v.
United States, 337 U.S. 293, 314 (1949).
204. Plaintiffs' Complaint,
20, 28, 31, 62, 73, Cravens (No. 943-387).
205. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 17000-17101.
TRIBUNE,
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The UPA was enacted in 1941206 for the express purpose of encouraging competition and safeguarding the public against the perpetuation of monopolies.2" 7 The UPA addresses "unfair trade practices."
These "unfair trade practices" include a wide range of unfair and deceptive business activities which may not affect competition, but, as
forms of trade regulation, are closely related to practices prohibited
under antitrust laws such as the Cartwright Act.2" 8 Whereas the Cartwright Act is designed to protect the existence of competition, the
UPA is designed to regulate existing competition. 20 9 One consequence
of this distinction is that the UPA is more specific than the Cartwright
Act in defining the types of practices it condemns. 210 The four primary areas of activity that are illegal under the UPA are locality dis2 12 loss leaders 213
crimination, 21 ' loss selling (i.e., product "dumping"),
and secret rebates and refunds.2 1 4
Business and Professions Code section 17045, the anti-secret rebate provision of the UPA, provides that "[tlhe secret payment or allowance of rebates, refunds, or commissions, or unearned discounts
...to the injury of a competitor and where such payment or allowance
tends to destroy competition, is unlawful. ' 2 15 Three elements must be
proven to establish a violation of section 17045: (1) a secret payment
or rebate by a seller to a purchaser, (2) the injury of a competitor and
(3) the tendency of such a rebate to destroy competition.2 16
The second requirement, "injury to a competitor," could have
possibly impacted the Cravens plaintiffs' standing to sue under section
17045. Arguably, because the statute is specifically concerned with
rebates that cause injury to competition, persons or parties who are
not competitors may not have standing to sue under this statute be217
cause they lack the requisite interest in the outcome of such suits.
It should be noted, however, that the manifest purpose of the UPA is
to safeguard the public against the creation or perpetuation of monop206. The Unfair Practices Act, ch. 526, § 1, 1941 Stats. 1839 (1941) (codified at CAL.
Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 17000-17101).
207. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17001.
208. Robert C. Fellmeth & Thomas A. Papageorge, A Treatise on State Antitrust Law
and Enforcement: With Models and Forms, Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 892,
Supp. No. 1, at 20-21 (Dec. 7, 1978).
209. Cowan, supra note 55, at 252.
210. Id. at 253.
211. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 17040, 17031.

212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.

Id. §§ 17043, 17048.5.
Id.§ 17044.
Id. § 17045.
Id.
E & H Wholesale, Inc. v. Glaser Bros., 204 Cal. Rptr. 838, 845 (Ct. App. 1984).
No California court has presently ruled on this issue.
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olies and to foster and encourage free, open competition. 218 Furthermore, section 17002 of the UPA states that the UPA's provisions
"shall be liberally construed so that its beneficial purposes may be
subserved. ' ,219 Consumers such as the Cravens plaintiffs have an interest in the free and open competition the UPA is designed to protect. Consequently, under a broad statutory construction, they also
should have a sufficient interest or stake in the outcome of claims arising under all UPA statutory provisions, including section 17045, to
have standing.
The claims of the Cravens plaintiffs also meet the requirement
that the rebates have a "tendency to destroy competition." The Plaintiffs' Complaint alleges that the rebate scheme of Ticketmaster-BASS
injures competition by enticing venues and promoters to enter into
exclusive dealing arrangements with the ticketing services, thereby
preventing other ticket distributors access to these tickets. 220 Ticketmaster argues that its "rebates" are merely a cost of doing business
in the live entertainment industry, no different than when a food or
parking lot concessionaire pays the venue for the right to sell their
services at a concert or sporting event. 221 This argument, however,
fails to note that, unlike the concessionaires' payments to venues, the
Ticketmaster rebate scheme has already shown its propensity to injure
competitors and destroy competition. Ticketmaster drove Ticketron
out of business largely because it guaranteed venues and promoters a
greater percentage of the service fee revenue; consumers then unknowingly supported this strategy by paying higher service charges.22 2
Since Ticketron's demise, the exclusive dealing agreements that contain the rebate scheme have made it extremely difficult or impossible
for a smaller ticketing service to succeed in direct competition with
Ticketmaster or BASS.2 23
A rebate scheme must also be "secret" for it to be unlawful under
section 17045.224 A rebate is "secret" where it is unknown by a significant number of purchasers and/or competitors of the seller.22 5 The
California courts offer little guidance as to what must be "secret"
218. See supra note 209 and accompanying text.
219. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17002.

220. Plaintiffs' Complaint, 62, Cravens (No. 943-387).
221. Mohl, supra note 12.
222. Evans, supra note 10; Pender, supra note 22; Gold, supra note 9.
223. See, e.g., Salner, supra note 48 (citing an independent ticket distributor asserting
that exclusive contracts are "strangling" it to death).
224. Harris v. Capitol Records Distrib. Corp., 413 P.2d 139, 145 (Cal. 1966).
225. See E & H Wholesale, Inc. v. Glaser Bros., 204 Cal. Rptr. 838, 845 (Ct. App. 1984);
G.H.I.I. v. MTS, Inc., 195 Cal. Rptr. 211, 221 (Ct. App. 1983).
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under section 17045-the practice of paying rebates, the actual terms
of the rebate or both? The actual practice of ticketing services rebating part of their service fees to venues and promoters is no secret. In
fact, rebating, along with the exclusive contract, has long been the accepted way to do business in the industry.226 While the practice itself
is well-known among competitors and customers throughout the industry, the actual terms of these rebate agreements are usually kept
secret.227 In one case, E & H Wholesale, Inc. v. GlaserBros., a California Court of Appeal found a rebate to be secret where the plaintiff
had presented declarations of several of the defendant's customers
that the defendant had a "bizarre pricing practice" of which customers
were not aware.228 The plaintiff also asserted that the defendant did
not announce its practice to customers in general.229 This case suggests that section 17045 prohibits the secret practice of paying rebates,
as opposed to prohibiting rebates where the practice is known, but the
actual rebate amounts are secret. This interpretation is also consistent
with the explicit language of section 17045, which provides that "the
secret payment or allowance of rebates" which injures a competitor
and tends to destroy competition, is unlawful. If these inferences are
correct, Ticketmaster and BASS's rebating practices are probably not
illegal under section 17045 because they are not secret payments of
rebates to purchasers. This is so despite the fact that these rebates
directly injure competitors and indirectly hurt consumers, and destroy
competition in the computerized ticketing services market.
D.

Unfair Competition Claim

The final major claim against the Cravens defendants was that
their conduct, including the alleged antitrust violations, constitutes
"unlawful, unfair, and deceptive business practices" which are prohibited by the Unfair Competition Statutes (UCS). 230 The substance of
the UCS is in Business and Professions Code section 17200, which defines "unfair competition" as an "unlawful, unfair or fraudulent busi226. See, e.g., Mohl, supra note 12 (describing a bidding war between Ticketmaster and
TicketPro); see also Hamlin supra note 5 (BASS attorney acknowledging that BASS often
pays promoters and venues a percentage of the service charge on each ticket sold).
227. For example, BASS's contract with the Concord Pavilion, a public facility owned
by the city of Concord, California, comes in two parts-one public and the other private.
The private portion contains the terms of the rebate that it receives from BASS. A "trade
secret" provision under the California Public Records Act protects this provision from
public disclosure. Pender, supra note 22.
228. 204 Cal. Rptr. 838, 845 (Ct. App. 1984) (emphasis added).
229. Id.
230. Plaintiff's Complaint, 73, Cravens (No. 943-387); see also CAL. Bus. & PROF.
CODE §§ 17200-17208.
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ness practice ...."23 The California Supreme Court has interpreted
this statutory language broadly: "The language ... explicitly extends
to any 'unlawful, unfair, or (deceptive) business practice;' the Legislature, in our view, intended by this sweeping language to permit tribunals to enjoin ongoing wrongful business conduct in whatever context
such activity might occur."23 2 Under this interpretation, any activity
that warrants consumer protection and involves an unfair or illegal
business practice would fall under the UCS.2 33 Indeed, the lower California courts have concluded that violations of the Cartwright Act are
included under the section 17200 definition of unfair competition.2 34
This means the Cravens defendants' apparent violations of the Cartwright Act create violations of the UCS as well.

III
Conclusion
Although it may never be known for sure because of the recent
class action settlements,23 5 it appears that the Cravens defendants
have engaged in conduct which is prohibited by the Cartwright Act
provisions of the California Business and Professions Code. Their exclusive dealing agreements are probably unlawful trade restraints
under both sections 16727 and 16720 because they foreclose a substantial share of competition. In addition, Ticketmaster and BASS have
violated section 16720 by horizontally dividing their competitive market into exclusive territories. Furthermore, these acts constitute violations of the California Unfair Competition Statutes. The defendants,
however, have probably not engaged in unlawful vertical price fixing
and Ticketmaster and BASS have probably have not made unlawful
secret payments of rebates to various venues and promoters.
A.

Distributing Damages

Since it was a consumer class action, if the Cravens suit had
reached the verdict stage there would have been inherent difficulties
231. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17200. Prior to 1977, when it was added to the Business and Professions Code, the UCS was located in §§ 3369-3370.1 of the California Civil
Code. Cowan, supra note 55, at 253; Act of July 7, 1977, ch. 299, § 1, 1977 Stat. 1201
(1977).
232. Barquis v. Merchants Collection Ass'n. of Oakland, Inc., 496 P.2d 817, 829 (Cal.
1972).
233. Cowan, supra note 55, at 254.
234. B.W.I. Custom Kitchen v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 235 Cal. Rptr. 228, 232 n.6 (Ct.
App. 1987); see People v. National Ass'n of Realtors, 174 Cal. Rptr. 728, 735-737 (Ct. App.
1981).
235. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
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in effectively distributing damages to those unnamed class members
who have been injured by the defendants' anticompetitive practices.
This is especially so because the Cravens class was quite large, even
for a consumer class action. The plaintiffs purported to represent
those who purchased tickets from defendants in California between
June 3, 1988 and the present and paid excessive charges in conjunction
with these ticket purchases.23 6
A primary device used in California state courts for distributing
damages to such large consumer classes is fluid recovery. 237 Fluid recovery simplifies the task of computing and distributing the damages
of a large consumer class by enabling the class members' damages to
be proven and distributed without resorting to individual proof of
claims.2 3 8 Instead, damages are calculated on the basis of the defendants' total sales to class members and these damages are constituted
into a fund out of which two payments usually are made. 239 The first
payment from the fund is made to those members of the class who
come forward with proof of their individual injuries.24° This first distribution typically does not exhaust the entire damage fund where individual damages are small, as they presumably would have been for
most Cravens class members. 24 1 This is because most persons will not
make the effort to collect.24 2 Therefore, a second distribution is made
which attempts to reach those class members who have not come forward.24 3 The most common means by which a second distribution is
done is through the product involved in the class action lawsuit.2 44
For example, a product or service which was overpriced because of an
antitrust violation can be offered at a discount price to purchasers in
the relevant market until the damage fund is exhausted. 2 45 This would
seem to have been the best way to distribute damages in the Cravens
suit. After a first distribution from a damage fund to those who prove
that they paid excessive service charges on ticket purchases, a second
236. Plaintiffs' Complaint, 3, Cravens (No. 943-387). The Notz class action settlement
applies to anyone who bought tickets from Ticketmaster, BASS or Ticketron between June
1, 1988 and Mar. 22, 1994. Hoover, supra note 5.
237. Jonathan P. Hayden, Comment, The CaliforniaState Courts and Consumer Class
Action for Antitrust Violations, 33 HASTINGS L.J. 689, 700 (1982).
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id.

241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id.

245. Id.; see, e.g., California v. Levi Strauss & Co., 715 P.2d 564 (Cal. 1986) (involving
consumer class action antitrust suit damages for the fixing of blue jeans prices distributed
by discounting the present price of blue jeans).
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distribution could have been made by offering a discount on ticket
service charges.
B. How to Prevent Antitrust Violations
It is unfortunate from a consumer standpoint that the recent class
action settlement does not address the true cause of the anticompetitive atmosphere in the computerized ticketing services industry, the
exclusive dealing agreement. Long-term exclusive dealing agreements
with the venues and promoters enable Ticketmaster and BASS to monopolize their markets. These contracts deny other ticket distributors
access to tickets and give Ticketmaster and BASS the ability to charge
any service charge without fear of consumers going elsewhere to buy
their tickets. As long as Ticketmaster and BASS have exclusive distribution agreements and split fees with venues and promoters there will
be incentive for high service fees. Indeed, history suggests that the
mere presence of competitors in the ticketing services market is not
enough to prevent anticompetitive practices. Even during the heyday
of their rivalry, Ticketmaster and Ticketron never competed on the
basis of lower service charges because they both bid for and received
exclusive contracts.2 4 6 Therefore, if true competition is to exist in the
computerized ticketing services market, venues and promoters would
probably have to be enjoined from entering into any sort of long-term
exclusive dealing agreements with Ticketmaster or BASS. Another
possible but unlikely solution would be legislation forbidding this
practice.
By prohibiting or regulating exclusive distribution agreements, all
ticketing services will presumably have access to tickets, and promoters and venues will invariably have to use more than one ticketing
service to distribute their tickets. As a result, competition between
ticketing services will increase. Consumers, thus, will not only have
more of a choice of where to purchase their tickets, but will also, for
the first time since the advent of computerized ticketing, be able to
determine for themselves what is the true cost of "convenience."

246. Pender, supra note 22.

